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CIVIL RIGHTS/ANTI-DISCRIMINATION—I DIDN’T VOLUNTEER FOR 
THIS: A SOLUTION FOR PROTECTING VOLUNTEERS FROM 
DISCRIMINATION IN MASSACHUSETTS 
Joseph D. Greenhalgh* 
Many have volunteered in some way or another.  Volunteers 
seek to help others and to improve themselves.  Unfortunately, 
if volunteers are discriminated against due to membership in a 
protected class, whether actual or perceived, they have very 
limited protections afforded to them. 
 
Few jurisdictions have examined what, if any, protections 
against discrimination should be available to volunteers.  
Federal circuit courts are conflicted regarding the 
circumstances under which volunteers should be protected 
pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  A small 
number of states have examined whether volunteers should be 
protected under state public accommodation anti-
discrimination statutes, with an even smaller number 
concluding that they should be protected under limited 
circumstances.  Nevertheless, none of these solutions would be 
sufficient in Massachusetts because the protections they provide 
are so narrowly applied. 
 
Massachusetts has not examined whether anti-discrimination 
protections should be expanded for volunteers.  When someone 
is not allowed to volunteer, he is denied multiple benefits he 
would receive by volunteering.  This Note argues that when 
someone is not allowed to volunteer at a place of public 
accommodation because of his membership or perceived 
membership in a protected class, he should be protected under 
the Massachusetts public accommodation anti-discrimination 
law without the limitations that are present in other states. 
 
*  Candidate for J.D. Western New England University School of Law, 2018.  A special 
thank you to Professor Taylor Flynn and to Kristen Dannay for mentoring me through the 
process and providing invaluable feedback.  I am thankful to the Western New England Law 
Review for all the support I received through the Note writing process.  A special thank you to 
my parents Sue and Rich Charter, for teaching me to always believe in myself and that I can do 
whatever I set my mind to, and to my husband Patrick Greenhalgh, for always being my rock 
and supporting me through everything. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine the following scenario: John and Jim are walking past the 
local food pantry and see a sign asking for volunteer help.  The two men 
enter the food pantry to volunteer their time and serve meals to the 
homeless.  The manager of the food pantry, believing John and Jim are a 
couple, tells them that the food pantry does not allow gay men to 
volunteer.  John and Jim neither admit nor deny that they are a couple, but 
the manager nevertheless does not allow them to volunteer. 
Having benefited from the food pantry’s services in the past, the men 
are upset and still want to help.  While leaving the building, they see a 
notice stating that donations are always accepted.  The next day, John and 
Jim bring five bags of non-perishable foods and a check for $200.00 to 
donate to the food pantry.  The manager of the food pantry refuses John 
and Jim’s donation because the homosexual lifestyle is against her 
personal belief.  John and Jim are upset because they were denied the 
ability to volunteer and make a donation; they seek legal help to determine 
their possible options for responding. 
Nearly half of all Americans claim to have engaged in some kind of 
volunteer effort,1 and about 25 percent of Massachusetts residents 
volunteer.2  In Massachusetts, there are three possible statutes under which 
a victim of discrimination may bring a claim: the Massachusetts civil 
rights statute, the Massachusetts employment anti-discrimination statute, 
and the Massachusetts public accommodation anti-discrimination statute.3  
Unfortunately, volunteers are currently unable to bring discrimination 
claims under the Massachusetts employment anti-discrimination statute, 
as case law has restricted its scope.4  Massachusetts courts have not yet 
addressed whether a volunteer can bring a claim under the public 
accommodations anti-discrimination statutes.5  Elsewhere, the few states 
that have ruled on whether volunteers can bring claims under public 
accommodation anti-discrimination statutes vary in their holdings.6  
 
1.  ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE 118 (2000). 
2.  Volunteering and Civic Engagements in Massachusetts, CORP. FOR NAT’L & 
COMMUNITY SERV., http://www.volunteeringinamerica.gov/MA [https://perma.cc/77ZQ-
KYJY] [hereinafter Volunteering in MA]. 
3.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, §§ 11H–I (2016); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4 
(2016); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 92A (2016). 
4.  Comey v. Hill, 438 N.E.2d 811, 814 (Mass. 1982). 
5.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98 (2016). 
6.  See generally Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts, Inc. v. Comm’n on Human Rights & 
Opportunities, 528 A.2d 352 (Conn. 1987) (holding Connecticut’s public accommodation anti-
discrimination statute does not cover someone offering her own services); Dale v. Boy Scouts 
of Am., 734 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1999) (holding that an openly homosexual male not allowed to be 
a scout leader can bring a claim under public accommodation anti-discrimination law), rev’d 
for First Amendment concerns, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); Johnson v. Plasma All., No. C2-99-1261, 
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Volunteers in Massachusetts are currently limited to common law 
remedies and potential claims under the Massachusetts civil rights 
statute.7  Therefore, Massachusetts greatly limits the protections and 
avenues for recourse available to John and Jim. 
In federal courts, circuits are split with regard to when a volunteer 
would be protected under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.8  The 
First Circuit, which encompasses Massachusetts, has not yet made a 
determination with regard to when Title VII protections would extend to 
volunteers.9  Regardless of the First Circuit’s determination, the 
protections of Title VII would have limited reach, as they would apply 
only to volunteers who offer their services and who assume the status of 
“employee.”10  Because courts have held that Title VII applies to 
employers discriminating against employees, it would only protect those 
volunteers who receive employee status, excluding volunteers who do not 
receive employee status or who donate money or goods.11  Therefore, 
receiving the benefits of Title VII is contingent upon the context in which 
the volunteering occurs.12 
For the purposes of this Note, volunteers are divided into two classes: 
service volunteers and donor volunteers.  John and Jim exemplified 
service volunteers when they offered to help serve food, and donor 
volunteers when they attempted to give money and non-perishables.  
Service volunteers are those who offer their time and services.  Donor 
volunteers, in contrast, are those who make donations.  Both types of 
volunteers receive benefits for their efforts, including physical, mental, 
 
2000 Minn. App. LEXIS 502 (Minn. Ct. App. May 23, 2000) (analyzing whether a plasma 
donation center discriminated against a donor under a public accommodation anti-
discrimination ordinance); Shepherdstown Volunteer Fire Dep’t v. State ex rel West Va. Human 
Rights Comm’n, 309 S.E.2d 342 (W.Va. 1983) (holding a volunteer fire department refusing to 
allow a female volunteer violated the public accommodation anti-discrimination statute). 
7.  See Lowery v. Klemm, 845 N.E.2d 1124, 1131 (Mass. 2006); see also MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 12, §§ 11H–I (2016) (protecting constitutional rights from being interfered with using 
threats, intimidation, or coercion, or attempted threats, intimidation, or coercion). 
8.  42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2014).  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was 
implemented to provide employees with federal protections against employment discrimination 
based on race, color, national origin, religion, and sex.  See generally id.  Michael H. Rubenstein, 
Our Nation’s Forgotten Workers: The Unprotected Volunteers, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 147, 
171 (2006).  Compare Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431 (5th Cir. 2013) 
(requiring a threshold remuneration test before analyzing whether a volunteer should be granted 
employee status), with Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc., 656 F.3d 348 (6th Cir. 
2011) (considering remuneration as one of multiple factors equally weighed when determining 
whether a volunteer should be granted employee status). 
9.  Keiko Rose, Volunteer Protection under Title VII: Is Remuneration Required?, 2014 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 605, 625 (2014). 
10.  Id. at 607. 
11.  See id. at 608–09. 
12.  See id. at 607–09. 
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emotional, sociological, professional, and financial benefits.13  If someone 
is denied the ability to volunteer due to discriminatory animus, he is also 
denied these benefits.  This Note argues that the Massachusetts public 
accommodation anti-discrimination statute should provide protections to 
anyone who is denied the opportunity to volunteer in a place of public 
accommodation based on actual or perceived membership in a protected 
class, because denial of the benefits a volunteer would receive equates to 
denial of advantages and privileges afforded to others outside the 
protected class.14  Public policy supports increased protections for 
volunteers, given that volunteers not only receive benefits themselves, but 
they also provide benefits to the community.15 
Part I of this Note provides background information exploring how 
federal courts could apply Title VII to protect volunteers from 
discrimination.  This part first addresses the general rule that volunteers 
are not afforded the protections of Title VII in federal jurisdictions due to 
lack of standing, because volunteers are not employees.  Part I then 
examines the exception to the general rule and the circuit split regarding 
the test used when determining whether a volunteer should receive 
employee status.  This part explains why neither approach—requiring 
remuneration or considering remuneration as part of a balancing test in 
determining whether someone is an employee—provides sufficient 
protection for volunteers in Massachusetts. 
 
13.  See, e.g., Mark Horoszowski, 5 Surprising Benefits Of Volunteering, FORBES (Mar. 
19, 2015, 1:22 PM), http://www forbes.com/sites/nextavenue/2015/03/19/5-surprising-
benefits-of-volunteering/#3bddb14f7c76 (click next to progress through list) [hereinafter 
Horoszowski, 5 Surprising Benefits] [http://perma.cc/Z6R5-QH9F]; Alan Feigenbaum, Benefits 
From Giving, FORBES (June 18, 2007, 1:00 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/2007/06/18/donations-charity-taxes-pf-education-
in_af_0618soapbox_inl html [http://perma.cc/A7A5-BJPL]. 
14.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 98 (2016).  Massachusetts prohibits discrimination 
in a place of public accommodation “on account of race, color, religious creed, national origin, 
sex, sexual orientation, . . . any physical or mental disability or ancestry . . . .”  Id.  
Discrimination on the basis of gender identity, which includes transgender status, has fallen 
under the category of sex discrimination for purposes of Title VII.  Sex-Based Discrimination, 
U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/sex.cfm 
[https://perma.cc/BV6Y-4Q5W].  Additionally, sexual harassment is considered a form of sex 
discrimination for purposes of Title VII.  Facts About Sexual Harassment, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/fs-sex.cfm 
[https://perma.cc/ZF3T-PMSW]. 
15.  See, e.g., Gae-Lynn Woods, Why Is it Important to Do Volunteer Work?, 
LIVESTRONG.COM (May 31, 2015), http://www.livestrong.com/article/190888-why-is-it-
important-to-do-volunteer-work/ [https://perma-archives.org/warc/YC9B-FL22/http://
www.livestrong.com/article/190888-why-is-it-important-to-do-volunteer-work]; Community 
Service: Top 10 Reasons to Volunteer, U.C. SAN DIEGO, https://students.ucsd.edu/student-
life/involvement/community/reasons html (last updated Aug. 2, 2016) [https://perma.cc/F9B8-
2UAA].  
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Part II of this Note examines the differing views among states with 
regard to whether state public accommodation anti-discrimination statutes 
afford protections to volunteers against discrimination.  Next, this part 
looks at the varied holdings of the four state courts that have addressed 
this question.  This part also explores why none of these approaches on 
their own would be adequate solutions in Massachusetts. 
Part III of this Note presents a solution that ensures all volunteers in 
Massachusetts are properly protected from discrimination.  This part 
begins with an analysis of what constitutes a place of public 
accommodation in Massachusetts.  Part III also addresses what protections 
the Massachusetts public accommodation anti-discrimination statutes 
provide.  Next, this part examines the various benefits that volunteers 
receive as a result of their efforts, and explains why the discriminatory 
denial of these benefits may amount to a violation of the Massachusetts 
public accommodation anti-discrimination statutes.  Finally, this part 
addresses why allowing volunteers to bring claims under the public 
accommodation anti-discrimination statutes is in the best interest of the 
Commonwealth for public policy reasons. 
I. CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE VOLUNTEERS ARE PROTECTED UNDER 
TITLE VII 
Congress implemented Title VII to combat workplace 
discrimination.16  Generally, Title VII does not protect volunteers due to 
lack of standing on the grounds that they are not employees, and, 
therefore, are outside the scope of the statute.17  However, in some 
circumstances, volunteers have been deemed to have employee status, 
thus falling within the scope of Title VII protections.18  Title VII circularly 
defines “employee” as “an individual employed by an employer.”19  Title 
VII defines “employer” as “a person who is engaged in an industry 
affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees . . . and any agent 
of such a person.”20  Black’s Law Dictionary defines “employer” as “[a] 
person, company, or organization for whom someone works . . . .”21  
 
16.  Rose, supra note 9, at 607.   
17.  Id.; see also Standing, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  Standing is “[a] 
party’s right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right.”  Id.  “To 
have standing in federal court, a plaintiff must show (1) that the challenged conduct has caused 
the plaintiff actual injury, and (2) that the interest sought to be protected is within the zone of 
interests meant to be regulated by the statutory or constitutional guarantee in question.”  Id. 
18.  Rose, supra note 9, at 607.  
19.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2014).  
20.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2014).  An agent is “[s]omeone who is authorized to act for or 
in place of another; a representative[.]”  Agent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
21.  Employer, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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Thus, should Title VII apply to volunteers, it would likely apply solely to 
service volunteers and not donor volunteers.22 
A. General Rule for Determining Whether a Volunteer is Considered 
an Employee under Title VII 
To determine whether a volunteer is an employee under Title VII, 
courts have adopted the common law agency test presented in Community 
for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid.23  Because Title VII does not apply to 
independent contractors, the Court in Reid applied the common law 
agency test in determining whether an artist would be considered an 
employee or an independent contractor.24  The question of employment 
was pertinent in determining whether the artist was considered an 
employee for purposes of the Copyright Act of 1976.25  The artist was not 
a regular employee of the company that commissioned him for a sculpture, 
but the Court analyzed whether the artist should be considered an 
employee for purposes of the Copyright Act, and therefore, whether the 
sculpture was a work made for hire.26 
In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the 
common law agency test, the Court in Reid considered various factors, 
which are useful in determining whether a volunteer is granted employee 
status.27  These factors included whether the hiring party had control over 
how tasks were accomplished, what skills were required to complete the 
tasks, and the source of the tools used in completion of the tasks.28  The 
Court also looked at the length of the relationship between the hiring party 
and the worker; whether the hiring party was able to assign additional 
 
22.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2014) (defining employee); 42 U.S.C. 2000e(b) (2014); 
Employer, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
23.  See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751–52 (1989); 
Rubenstein, supra note 8. 
24.  Reid, 490 U.S. at 751.  Accord Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 
323–24 (1992); cf. Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 791 F.3d 376, 385 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(“[Regarding whether interns are employees,] the proper question is whether the intern or the 
employer is the primary beneficiary of the relationship . . . .”). 
25.  17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(b) (2014); Reid, 490 U.S. at 732–733.  While Reid examined 
whether someone was an employee for purposes of the Copyright Act of 1976, the test used 
could also be used in other cases where it is important to determine whether someone is an 
employee.  See id. 
26.  Reid, 490 U.S. at 738.  “A ‘work made for hire’ is . . . prepared by an employee 
within the scope of his or her employment; or . . . specially ordered or commissioned for use as 
a contribution to a collective work.”  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2014).  Additionally, in other specific 
situations, a work could be considered a “work made for hire” when a written instrument is 
signed by the parties showing an agreement that the work is to be considered a work made for 
hire.  Id. 
27.  See id. at 751. 
28.  Id. 
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tasks to the worker; whether the worker could determine how long he 
worked; and how the worker was paid.29  Finally, the Court factored in 
whether the worker could hire and pay an assistant; whether the work 
being done was part of the hiring party’s normal type of business; whether 
the worker received employee benefits as a result of his working for the 
hiring party; the tax treatment of the worker; and whether the hiring party 
was still in business.30 
After weighing the factors, the Court determined the artist was an 
independent contractor and not an employee.31  Although Reid provided a 
test for determining whether a hired party is an employee under Title VII, 
there is disagreement regarding one key component of the test.32 
B. Circuit Split Regarding Whether Remuneration is a Threshold 
Factor to Overcome before Applying the Common Law Agency Test 
Circuits are split with regard to whether remuneration is a factor to 
consider in the common law agency test for employee status, or whether 
the question of remuneration is a threshold that must be surpassed before 
the test is considered.33  “Remuneration” is defined as “[p]ayment; 
compensation, esp[ecially] for a service that someone has performed.”34  
Whereas a small number of circuits consider remuneration as a factor in 
the common law agency test, the majority of circuits consider 
remuneration as a threshold test that must be overcome before considering 
the common law agency test.35 
Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire Department, Inc.36 serves as an 
example of how the minority of circuits view remuneration in relation to 
the common law agency test.37  Bryson addressed whether workers who 
only receive de minimis benefits are considered employees under Title 
VII.38  Marcia Bryson, an employee for the Middlefield Volunteer Fire 
Department, filed charges alleging discrimination on the basis of sex and 
 
29.  Id. 
30.  Id. at 751–52. 
31.  Id. at 752. 
32.  See Rose, supra note 9, at 607.  
33.  See id. 
34.  Remuneration, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
35.  Rose, supra note 9, at 607.  “The Second, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh 
Circuits have adopted a . . . threshold-remuneration test.”  Id. at 615.  “The Sixth and Ninth 
Circuits . . . view remuneration as only one, non-dispositive factor in conjunction with the other 
common law agency test factors.”  Id. at 623. 
36.  656 F.3d 348 (6th Cir. 2011). 
37.  See Rose, supra note 9, at 623.  
38.  Bryson, 656 F.3d at 351. 
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retaliation.39  The firefighters in the department were considered volunteer 
members as opposed to employees.40  Bryson originally joined the 
department as a volunteer member, but later was hired as an employee in 
the role of administrative assistant.41  In determining whether to consider 
the firefighters as employees for purposes of Title VII, the district court 
viewed compensation as a necessary requirement before considering the 
common law agency test.42  As a result, the district court granted partial 
summary judgment for the fire department, concluding the department did 
not have enough employees to support a Title VII claim.43  The Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the granting of summary judgment, 
determining that while remuneration is a factor that must be considered, it 
should only be weighed as a factor in the common law agency test and 
should not be an initial hurdle for plaintiffs to overcome.44 
In contrast, Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire District No. 545 
exemplifies the majority view among circuits, finding that a volunteer 
must receive remuneration before the court will look to the common law 
agency test.46  Rachel Juino was a volunteer firefighter who filed charges 
under Title VII alleging sexual harassment and retaliation.47  Because the 
Fifth Circuit had not previously adopted a test for determining whether a 
volunteer should be granted employee status, the district court opted for 
the threshold remuneration test.48  The court of appeals considered both 
approaches for determining whether a volunteer should receive employee 
status; ultimately, the court of appeals agreed with the district court and 
adopted the threshold remuneration test.49  The Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals concluded Juino was not an employee under Title VII because 
she “failed to make a threshold showing of remuneration.”50  The court of 
appeals further stated that it is Congress’s prerogative to provide a remedy 
to volunteers in Juino’s position if it wishes to do so, thereby allowing for 
protection under Title VII; it is not for the court to provide the remedy.51 
 
39.  Id. at 350. 
40.  Id. 
41.  Id. 
42.  Id. at 351.  The issue of whether Bryson’s claim would fall under Title VII hinged 
on whether the volunteer members were considered employees, as Title VII requires a business 
to have fifteen employees.  See id. at 350. 
43.  Id. at 351. 
44.  Id. at 355–56.  
45.  717 F.3d 431 (5th Cir. 2013). 
46.  See Rose, supra note 9, at 615.  
47.  Juino, 717 F.3d at 432. 
48.  Id. at 433. 
49.  Id. at 439. 
50.  Id. at 440. 
51.  Id. at 439. 
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The First Circuit has not made a decision regarding whether 
remuneration should be a threshold requirement when applying the 
common law agency test to volunteers.52  Nevertheless, the First Circuit 
has used the common law agency test in cases not involving volunteers.53  
For example, in Lopez v. Massachusetts, the court used the common law 
agency test to determine whether the Massachusetts Human Resources 
Division is an employer of municipal police officers.54  The issue arose 
after minority police officers brought a claim of disparate impact under 
Title VII.55  Because the police officers brought suit against the 
Commonwealth, it was necessary to determine whether the officers were 
employees of the Massachusetts Human Resources Division.56  The First 
Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that the United States Supreme Court 
had stated, when a statute containing the term “employee” does not define 
the term, “a court must presume that Congress has incorporated traditional 
agency law principles for identifying ‘master-servant relationships.’”57  In 
applying the common law agency test, the court concluded that the 
Massachusetts Human Resources Division is not the plaintiffs’ employer 
for purposes of Title VII.58 
In contrast, the court in Mahoney v. Morgan examined whether the 
defendant was an employer under the Americans with Disabilities Act.59  
Mahoney worked for Morgan in a veterinary hospital and alleged that 
Morgan failed to provide reasonable accommodations to help alleviate 
symptoms of Mahoney’s disability while she was working.60  Morgan 
eventually terminated Mahoney’s employment.61 
Morgan argued that she did not have enough employees to support a 
 
52.  Rose, supra note 9, at 625.  “The First, Third, and Seventh Circuits have not yet ruled 
on this issue.”  Id. 
53.  See generally Lopez v. Massachusetts, 588 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2009); Mahoney v. 
Morgan, No. 08-10879-MBB, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97224 (D. Mass. Sept. 16, 2010). 
54.  Lopez, 588 F.3d at 83. 
55.  Id. at 72.  Disparate impact is “[t]he adverse effect of a facially neutral practice . . . 
that nonetheless discriminates against persons because of their [membership in a protected 
class] and that is not justified by business necessity.”  Disparate Impact, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
56.  Lopez, 588 F.3d at 72.   
57.  Id. at 83 (citing, inter alia, Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 
U.S. 440, 444–47 (2003)).  In this context, “master-servant” refers to an employer-employee 
relationship.  Id. at 83 n.13. 
58.  Id. at 85. 
59.  42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(B) (2014); Mahoney v. Morgan, No. 08-10879-MBB, 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97224, at *16 (D. Mass. Sept. 16, 2010).  The definitions of “employee” and 
“employer” are substantially similar under both Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities 
Act.  Id. at *17. 
60.  Mahoney, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97224, at *6–7. 
61.  Id. at *7. 
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claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act.62  For that reason, the 
court applied the common law agency test to multiple workers in order to 
determine whether they were employees under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, and consequently, whether Morgan was an employer 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act.63  In its analysis, the court 
addressed how the common law agency test does not present a clear 
formula for determining employee status, and therefore “all of the 
incidents of the relationship must be assessed and weighed with no one 
factor being decisive.”64  The court ultimately determined a reasonable 
jury using the common law agency test could find that many of the 
workers were employees,65 and, as a result, denied Morgan’s motion for 
summary judgment.66 
Whereas Lopez and Mahoney do not address whether remuneration 
should be a threshold test when determining a volunteer’s employee status 
in the First Circuit, the cases nevertheless may indicate how courts in the 
First Circuit might rule on the matter in the future.67  In Lopez, the court 
emphasized that employee status “under Title VII must be determined by 
the ‘actual circumstances of the person’s relationship’ with the defendant 
and not just the label.”68  This statement emphasizes the view that a worker 
need not be labeled as an employee to obtain employee status.69  Similarly, 
the court in Mahoney said “lack of evidence of payment . . . is not 
necessarily a bar to a determination of employee status . . . .  A volunteer 
may be covered . . . if he is receiving benefits.”70  This implies the First 
Circuit would not require a threshold remuneration test prior to applying 
the common law agency test for volunteers.71 
C. Whichever Test the First Circuit Adopts, the Protections for 
Volunteers in Massachusetts Will Still Be Insufficient 
Whichever determination the First Circuit makes on this issue, it will 
 
62.  Id. at *16–17.  Both Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act define an 
employer as having fifteen or more employees.  42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (2014). 
63.  Mahoney, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97224 at *20–30.   
64.  Id. at *20 (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992)). 
65.  Id. at *29–30. 
66.  Id. at *33. 
67.  See generally Lopez v. Massachusetts, 588 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2009); Mahoney, 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97224. 
68.  Lopez, 588 F.3d at 86 (quoting Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 987 (1st Cir. 
1997)). 
69.  See id. at 86. 
70.  Mahoney, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97244 at *23 (citing U.S. EQUAL EMP. 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, NEW COMPLIANCE MANUAL, ¶ 7110, § 2-III (A)(1)(c) (2009)). 
71.  See id. (citing U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, NEW COMPLIANCE 
MANUAL, ¶ 7110, § 2-III (A)(1)(c) (2009)). 
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not provide a satisfactory solution for volunteer protections in 
Massachusetts, because the common law agency test would only apply to 
service volunteers.72  Regardless of whether the First Circuit applies the 
threshold remuneration test or consider remuneration solely as a factor in 
the common law agency test, potential Title VII protection would not 
apply to donor volunteers because they cannot satisfy the common law 
agency test elements.73 
Additionally, should the First Circuit adopt either test for 
determining employment status under Title VII, the test would not likely 
extend to state laws in Massachusetts.74  Massachusetts has intimated that 
in state courts, volunteers cannot bring a discrimination claim under the 
Massachusetts employment anti-discrimination laws.75  In Comey v. Hill, 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court determined whether 
Massachusetts law considers an independent contractor an employee.76  
Comey brought a claim alleging age discrimination under the 
Massachusetts employment anti-discrimination statute.77  Comey 
contested the superior court judge’s instruction that distinguished an 
independent contractor from an employee with regard to the scope of the 
Massachusetts employment anti-discrimination law.78 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated that “[i]n the 
absence of any indication to the contrary, we will not assume that the 
Legislature intended to cover relationships outside the traditional common 
law employer-employee relationship.”79  This holding is significant 
because a volunteer would not fit into the traditional employer-employee 
relationship.80  Therefore, regardless of the First Circuit’s eventual 
determination on how to ascertain whether a volunteer should be granted 
employee status, the solution would be inadequate as it would only be 
functional in federal courts and would not extend into the Massachusetts 
state courts. 
II. ABILITY OF VOLUNTEERS TO BRING DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS 
UNDER STATE PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION ANTI-DISCRIMINATION 
 
72.  See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751–52 (1989). 
73.  See id. 
74.  See Comey v. Hill, 438 N.E.2d 811, 814 (Mass. 1982). 
75.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4 (2016); Comey, 438 N.E.2d at 814. 
76.  Comey, 438 N.E.2d at 814. 
77.  Id. at 812–13. 
78.  Id. at 813–14. 
79.  Id. at 814. 
80.  See id.  “We will not depart from the common law definition of employee absent a 
legislative substitute.”  Id. 
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STATUTES 
Various states have implemented public accommodation anti-
discrimination laws for the purpose of preventing discrimination in places 
of public accommodation.81  Massachusetts defines a place of public 
accommodation as “any place, whether licensed or unlicensed, which is 
open to and accepts or solicits the patronage of the general public . . . .”82  
Five states do not have laws preventing discrimination in places of public 
accommodation: Texas, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and North 
Carolina.83  Only three states—Connecticut, New Jersey, and West 
Virginia—have judicial opinions reflecting whether a volunteer can bring 
a discrimination claim under statutes governing discrimination in a place 
of public accommodation are Connecticut, West Virginia, and New 
Jersey.84  These states’ holdings have encompassed decisions both 
disallowing the claims85 and allowing volunteers to bring claims under the 
public accommodation anti-discrimination statutes.86  Additionally, 
Minnesota has examined whether a volunteer can bring a discrimination 
claim under a city ordinance governing discrimination in a place of public 
accommodation.87 
A. Service Volunteers in Connecticut 
Connecticut analyzed whether a service volunteer could bring a 
claim under the public accommodation anti-discrimination statute in 
Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts, Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights & 
Opportunities.88  Catherine Pollard volunteered with the Boy Scouts in 
 
81.  Discrimination in Public Accommodations, FINDLAW, http:// 
civilrights findlaw.com/enforcing-your-civil-rights/discrimination-in-public-
accommodations html [http://perma.cc/KKT5-7TY2].  There are federal statutes prohibiting 
discrimination in a place of public accommodation; however, the issue of whether these statutes 
would apply to a volunteer have not been addressed.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2014). 
82.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 92A (2016).  See also infra Section III.A.  Generally, 
statutes defining “place of public accommodation” will also provide a non-exhaustive list of 
examples of places of public accommodation.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2014); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 272, § 92A (2016). 
83.  State Public Accommodation Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (July 13, 
2016), http://www ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-public-accommodation-
laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/5S95-YVPK].   
84.  See generally Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts, Inc. v. Comm’n on Human Rights & 
Opportunities, 528 A.2d 352 (Conn. 1987); Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 
1999) rev’d for First Amendment concerns, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); Shepherdstown Volunteer 
Fire Dep’t v. State ex rel West Va. Human Rights Comm’n, 309 S.E.2d 342 (W. Va. 1983).  
85.  See generally Quinnipiac Council, 528 A.2d 352. 
86.  See generally Dale, 734 A.2d 1196; Shepherdstown, 309 S.E.2d 342. 
87.  See generally Johnson v. Plasma All., No. C2-99-1261, 2000 Minn. App. LEXIS 502 
(Minn. Ct. App. May 23, 2000).   
88.  See generally Quinnipiac Council, 528 A.2d 352. 
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various roles from 1972–76.89  Nevertheless, when Pollard applied to be a 
scoutmaster, she was refused because “the policy of the Boy Scouts of 
America [says] that scoutmasters [must] be men at least 21 years of age.”90  
Pollard appealed the lower court decision, arguing the court erred in 
determining that the Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts, Inc. was not a place 
of public accommodation.91 
On appeal, the court analyzed both whether Quinnipiac Council, Boy 
Scouts, Inc. was a place of public accommodation and whether failure to 
allow a woman to serve as a Boy Scouts scoutmaster violated the 
Connecticut public accommodation anti-discrimination statute.92  The 
Connecticut public accommodation anti-discrimination statute provides 
that it is discriminatory “[t]o deny any person within the jurisdiction of 
this state full and equal accommodations in any place of public 
accommodation.”93  The court looked into the legislative history of the 
public accommodation anti-discrimination statute and found it doubtful 
that the Legislature meant to require a physical site for an organization to 
fit into the definition of a “place of public accommodation.”94  As a result, 
the court determined that in Connecticut, coverage under the public 
accommodation anti-discrimination statute does not require a physical 
place as an essential element of the statute.95  Nevertheless, the court held 
the public accommodation anti-discrimination statute did not encompass 
a volunteer offering her own services.96 
B. Service Volunteers in West Virginia 
West Virginia analyzed whether a service volunteer could bring a 
claim under the public accommodation anti-discrimination statute in 
Shepherdstown Volunteer Fire Department v. State ex rel West Virginia 
Human Rights Commission.97  In Shepherdstown, the court consolidated 
two separate cases where a fire department denied females the opportunity 
to volunteer because of their sex.98  The Shepherdstown Volunteer Fire 
 
89.  Id. at 355. 
90.  Id. 
91.  Id. 
92.  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-64 (2015); Quinnipiac Council, 528 A.2d at 354. 
93.  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-64(a) (2015). 
94.  Quinnipiac Council, 528 A.2d at 357. 
95.  Id. at 358. 
96.  Id. at 360; see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-64 (2015) (prohibiting denial of “full 
and equal accommodations in any place of public accommodation”). 
97.  See generally Shepherdstown Volunteer Fire Dep’t v. State ex rel West Va. Human 
Rights Comm’n, 309 S.E.2d 342 (W. Va. 1983).  See also W. VA. CODE § 5-11-3 (2016); W. 
VA. CODE § 5-11-9 (2016). 
98.  Shepherdstown, 309 S.E.2d at 344. 
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Department denied membership to three female applicants without giving 
an explanation or allowing for reconsideration.99  Similarly, the Berkeley 
Springs Volunteer Fire Department’s constitution required members 
(volunteer firefighters) be male, prompting the return of female 
applicants’ applications without consideration.100  The Berkeley Springs 
Volunteer Fire Department amended the constitution to remove the 
restriction, but continued to deny applications of females for 
membership.101 
The court examined whether a service volunteer could bring a claim 
under the West Virginia anti-discrimination statute by determining 
whether a volunteer fire department is a place of public accommodation, 
and therefore whether the exclusion of women from volunteering 
constituted a violation of the statute.102  The West Virginia anti-
discrimination statute encompasses both employment discrimination and 
discrimination in a place of public accommodation.103  The statute makes 
it an unlawful discriminatory act to “[r]efuse, withhold from or deny . . . 
any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services 
of [a] place of public accommodation[]” because of someone’s 
membership in a protected class.104 
Additionally, West Virginia statutes extensively regulate volunteer 
fire departments.105  The court found a volunteer fire department is a place 
of public accommodation because the fire department received some 
public funding, thereby making it a quasi-governmental body, and 
because the fire department provided a service to the public.106  As a result, 
 
99.  Id. 
100.  Id. at 346. 
101.  Id. 
102.  W. VA. CODE § 5-11-3 (2016); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9 (2016); Shepherdstown, 309 
S.E.2d at 347–48. 
103.  W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9 (2016). 
104.  W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9(6)(A) (2016).  See also Accommodation, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A convenience supplied by someone; esp., lodging and food.”); 
Advantage, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“Any benefit or gain . . . .”); Facility, 
MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2004) (“[S]omething that makes an 
action, operation, or course of conduct easier . . . .”); Privilege, MERRIAM WEBSTER’S 
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2004) (“[A] right or benefit that is given to some people 
and not to others.”); Service, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“[T]he performance 
of some useful act or series of acts for the benefit of another, usu[ally] for a fee . . . an intangible 
commodity in the form of human effort . . . .”). 
105.  Shepherdstown, 309 S.E.2d at 349.  West Virginia statutes give power to 
municipalities to allow for the formation of volunteer fire departments and to establish the 
minimum and maximum number of people necessary to form a volunteer fire department, while 
simultaneously making the volunteer fire department “subject to the authority of the governing 
body.”  Id. (citing W. VA. CODE §§ 8-15-1, -4 (2014)). 
106.  Id. at 351. 
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volunteer fire departments are subject to West Virginia’s public 
accommodation anti-discrimination statute with regard to volunteer 
firefighters.107 
C. Service Volunteers in New Jersey 
New Jersey analyzed whether a service volunteer could bring a claim 
under the anti-discrimination statute in Dale v. Boy Scouts of America.108  
Dale was an Assistant Scoutmaster with the Boy Scouts who realized he 
was gay when he went to college.109  Dale was interviewed following his 
attendance at a seminar about the psychological needs of gay and lesbian 
teenagers, and shortly thereafter he received a letter, revoking his 
membership and asking him to sever all ties with the Boy Scouts.110  
According to the letter, Dale’s membership was revoked because the Boy 
Scouts of America expressly prohibits lesbian and gay adults from being 
members.111 
To determine whether a service volunteer could bring a claim under 
the anti-discrimination statute, the New Jersey Supreme Court examined 
whether the Boy Scouts of America, an organization, could be considered 
a place of public accommodation.112  The New Jersey anti-discrimination 
statute encompasses both employment discrimination and discrimination 
in a place of public accommodation, stating “[a]ll persons shall have the 
opportunity . . . to obtain all the accommodations, advantages, facilities, 
and privileges of any place of public accommodation” regardless of their 
membership in a protected class.113  The court observed that the statute 
must be interpreted liberally as the Legislature had directed.114 
The court also recognized that for twenty-five years, a “place” has 
not been restricted to a fixed location in New Jersey.115  The court 
referenced an earlier case in which it found “[t]he statutory noun place . . . 
is a term of convenience, not of limitation[,] . . . employed to reflect the 
fact that public accommodations are commonly provided at fixed 
places.”116  Additionally, the court addressed how the Legislature has done 
 
107.  Id. at 352. 
108.  See generally Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1999) rev’d for First 
Amendment concerns, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
109.  Id. at 1204. 
110.  Id. at 1205. 
111.  Id.  “[The] Boy Scouts claims that the language ‘morally straight’ and ‘clean’ in the 
Oath and Law, respectively, constitutes a rejection of homosexuality.”  Id. at 1202. 
112.  Id. at 1207–08. 
113.  N.J. STAT. ANN § 10:5-4 (West 2016). 
114.  Dale, 734 A.2d at 1208. 
115.  Id. at 1209. 
116.  Id. (quoting Nat’l Org. of Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 318 A.2d 33, 37 
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nothing to limit the definition of “place.”117  As a result, the court 
concluded the Boy Scouts organization is subject to the New Jersey law 
against discrimination because it is a “place of public accommodation.”118  
The court further concluded the revocation of Dale’s membership equated 
to a denial of privileges and advantages, which therefore violated the anti-
discrimination law.119 
D. Donor Volunteers in Minnesota 
Minnesota determined whether a donor volunteer could bring a claim 
alleging discrimination in a place of public accommodation in Johnson v. 
Plasma Alliance.120  Johnson brought a claim under a Minneapolis 
ordinance banning discrimination in a place of public accommodation in 
the city on the basis of affectional preference.121  The claim arose when 
Johnson attempted to donate plasma and Plasma Alliance asked whether 
“he had had sex with another man since 1977.”122  Johnson said he had, 
and as a result was not allowed to donate.123  Four years later, Johnson 
discovered that he was a permanently-rejected donor as a result of the 
incident.124 
The analysis of whether Plasma Alliance violated the ordinance 
proceeded as if Plasma Alliance were a place of public accommodation.125  
 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974)). 
117.  Id at 1210. 
118.  Id. at 1230. 
119.  Id.  The United States Supreme Court reversed this decision because requiring the 
Boy Scouts to allow a homosexual scout leader violated the organization’s First Amendment 
rights.  Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 661 (2000).  The United States Supreme Court 
did not find the New Jersey Supreme Court was incorrect in determining the Boy Scouts is a 
place of public accommodation under New Jersey law.  Id.  
120.  See generally Johnson v. Plasma All., No. C2-99-1261, 2000 Minn. App. LEXIS 
502 (Ct. App. May 23, 2000). 
121.  Id. at *2.  “Affectional preference is defined as ‘having or manifesting an emotional 
or physical attachment to another consenting person or persons, or having or manifesting a 
preference for such attachment, or having or projecting a self-image not associated with one’s 
biological maleness or one’s biological femaleness.’”  Id. at *4 (quoting MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., 
CODE OF ORDINANCES, Title 7, § 139.20 (1990)).  The Minneapolis ordinance has since been 
updated to replace instances of “affectional preference” with “sexual orientation.”  
MINNEAPOLIS MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES, Title 7, § 139 (2006), 
http://www.minneapolismn.gov/www/groups/public/@council/
documents/webcontent/convert_278654.pdf [https://perma.cc/KL3K-F529].  
122.  Johnson, 2000 Minn. App. LEXIS 502 at *1–2. 
123.  Id. at *2. 
124.  Id. 
125.  See generally id.; cf. Levorsen v. Octapharma Plasma, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-325, 2014 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166360, at *11–12, *18 (D. Utah Dec. 1, 2014) (holding a plasma donation 
center is not a place of public accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act as the 
plasma donation center pays the donor for the plasma and then sells the plasma for a profit). 
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The court held that Plasma Alliance did not violate the ordinance, but did 
not address whether Plasma Alliance was a place of public 
accommodation.126  Ultimately, the court found Johnson was not actually 
discriminated against by Plasma Alliance, drawing upon a now repudiated 
distinction between Johnson not being allowed to donate because of his 
status (affectional preference) and his conduct (because he had sex with 
another man).127 
E. The Approaches of Other States Regarding Discrimination Claims 
of Volunteers under Public Accommodation Anti-Discrimination 
Statutes are Inadequate in Massachusetts 
Massachusetts has consistently pioneered the promulgation of laws 
prohibiting discrimination.128  Massachusetts was the first state in the 
country to legalize same-sex marriage,129 and was the second state in the 
nation to implement a comprehensive anti-discrimination law protecting 
individuals from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in 
housing, public accommodations, employment, credit, and services.130  
Additionally, Massachusetts has implemented legislation to protect 
transgender people from discrimination.131  The Equal Rights Amendment 
 
126.  Johnson, 2000 Minn. App. LEXIS 502, at *12. 
127. Id. at *11.  In Lawrence v. Texas, the United States Supreme Court overturned a 
statute criminalizing sodomy, because making the conduct criminal punishes the status.  
Lawrence v. Tex., 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003).  The Court held that “[w]hen homosexual conduct 
is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject 
homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.”  Id. at 575.  
Justice O’Connor expounds on this idea, stating “[w]hile it is true the law applies only to 
conduct, the conduct targeted by this law is conduct that is closely correlated with being 
homosexual. . . . Texas’ sodomy law is targeted at more than conduct.  It is instead directed 
toward gay persons as a class.”  Id. at 583 (O’Connor, J. concurring). 
128.  History of the MCAD, MASS.GOV, http://www mass.gov/mcad/about/mcad-
history html [https://perma.cc/84DD-CFYT].  In 1944, the governor of Massachusetts 
implemented a committee to combat discrimination, which later became the Massachusetts 
Commission Against Discrimination.  Id.  Massachusetts laws prohibiting discrimination in 
employment and in places of public accommodation offer protections from discrimination on 
account of sex, sexual orientation, disability, national origin, race, color, and religious creed.  
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4 (2016); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 98 (2016). 
129.  Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003).  “Limiting 
the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage to opposite-sex couples violates the 
basic premises of individual liberty and equality under the law protected by the Massachusetts 
Constitution.”  Id. 
130.  Anti-Discrimination Law in Massachusetts, GLAD (Feb. 11, 2014), https://
www.glad.org/rights/massachusetts/c/anti-discrimination-law-in-massachusetts [https://
perma.cc/29XD-Y5S6]. 
131.  Id.; see MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 22C, § 32 (2016) (stating that a “threatened, 
attempted or completed overt act motivated at least in part by . . . gender identity” constituted a 
hate crime).  The First Circuit Court of Appeals has also held that it is possible to assert a theory 
of sex discrimination based on being treated disparately for not conforming to gender norms.  
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to the Massachusetts Constitution provides that cases of sex 
discrimination will be examined under strict scrutiny.132  Accordingly, 
providing enhanced protections against discrimination to volunteers in 
Massachusetts is consistent with the State’s historical views and stances 
regarding discrimination.133 
The methods other states use with regard to volunteers’ 
discrimination claims are inadequate solutions in Massachusetts.134  The 
state that has refused to allow a volunteer to bring a discrimination claim 
under public accommodation anti-discrimination law—Connecticut—
would provide an ineffective solution for Massachusetts to follow as this 
approach provides no additional protections to volunteers.135  The states 
that have allowed volunteers to allege claims of discrimination in a place 
of public accommodation—Minnesota, New Jersey, and West Virginia—
could serve as a starting point for Massachusetts.136  Nevertheless, 
Massachusetts would need to expand beyond the scope of protection given 
to volunteers in these other states as each state only addresses either 
service volunteers or donor volunteers; Massachusetts should implement 
a protection for all types of volunteers.137  However, the limited scope of 
these other states could simply be the product of the limited number of 
cases in which volunteers allege discrimination in a place of public 
accommodation.138 
 
Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 215 (1st Cir. 2000). 
132.  Lorianne Sainsbury-Wong, Benjamin Wilson & Alyssa Vangeli, The Useful but 
Overlooked Massachusetts Equal Rights Amendment, MASSBAR (Aug. 2011), 
http://www.massbar.org/publications/lawyers-journal/2011/august/the-useful-but-overlooked-
massachusetts-equal-rights-amendment [https://perma.cc/4MG2-F6LB]. 
133.  See History of the MCAD, supra note 128.   
134.  See generally Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts, Inc. v. Comm’n on Human Rights 
& Opportunities, 528 A.2d 352 (Conn. 1987); Johnson v. Plasma All., No. C2-99-1261, 2000 
Minn. App. LEXIS 502 (Ct. App. May 23, 2000); Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196 
(N.J. 1999) rev’d for First Amendment concerns, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); Shepherdstown 
Volunteer Fire Dep’t v. State ex rel West Va. Human Rights Comm’n, 309 S.E.2d 342 (W. Va. 
1983). 
135.  See generally Quinnipiac Council, 528 A.2d 352. 
136.  See generally Johnson, 2000 Minn. App. LEXIS 502 (allowing a donor volunteer 
to bring a claim alleging discrimination in a place of public accommodation); Dale, 734 A.2d 
1196 (allowing a service volunteer to bring a claim alleging discrimination in a place of public 
accommodation); Shepherdstown, 309 S.E.2d 342 (allowing service volunteers to bring a claim 
alleging discrimination in a place of public accommodation). 
137.  See generally Johnson, 2000 Minn. App. LEXIS 502 (allowing a donor volunteer 
to bring a claim alleging discrimination in a place of public accommodation); Dale, 734 A.2d 
1196 (allowing a service volunteer to bring a claim alleging discrimination in a place of public 
accommodation); Shepherdstown, 309 S.E.2d 342 (allowing service volunteers to bring a claim 
alleging discrimination in a place of public accommodation). 
138.  See generally Quinnipiac Council, 528 A.2d 352 (holding that Connecticut’s public 
accommodation anti-discrimination statute does not cover someone offering her own services); 
Johnson, 2000 Minn. App. LEXIS 502 (analyzing whether a plasma donation center 
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F. State Views on Discrimination with Regard to Interns 
It is worthwhile to note that six states and the District of Columbia 
have recently amended statutes to reflect protections for a specific type of 
service volunteers: interns.139  Connecticut is the most recent state to 
provide protections for unpaid interns against discrimination and sexual 
harassment,140 joining California,141 Maryland,142 New York,143 
Oregon,144 Illinois,145 and the District of Columbia.146  Whereas the 
protections for unpaid interns are beneficial, the scope of these protections 
is unfortunately very limited because they only apply to a small class of 
service volunteers.147  Additionally, the Connecticut statute offers 
protections to interns specifically in the context of employment-like 
relationships where someone is working with the intention of gaining 
training and experience.148  Furthermore, these protections do not address 
whether an intern or any other type of volunteer can bring a claim under 
public accommodation anti-discrimination law.149  If Massachusetts 
implemented statutory protection for unpaid interns akin to Connecticut, 
only a specific class of service volunteers would receive protections.150 
Massachusetts legislators  must also be cognizant of the hurdle presented 
by Comey v. Hill, which requires explicit notice of legislative intent to 
 
discriminated against a donor under a public accommodation anti-discrimination ordinance); 
Dale, 734 A.2d 1196 (holding that an openly homosexual male not allowed to be a scout leader 
can bring a claim under public accommodation anti-discrimination law; Shepherdstown, 309 
S.E.2d 342 (holding that a volunteer fire department refusing to allow a female volunteer 
violated the public accommodation anti-discrimination statute). 
139.  Samantha Lachman, A Shocking Number of States Don’t Protect Unpaid Interns 
from Discrimination and Sexual Harassment, HUFF. POST (May 27, 2015, 4:17 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/05/27/unpaid-interns-harassment_n_7453826. html 
[https://perma.cc/HDJ6-HBTK]. 
140.  2015 Conn. Acts 56 (2015). 
141.  CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940 (Deering 2016) (protecting unpaid interns from 
discrimination and sexual harassment). 
142.  MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 20-610 (LexisNexis 2016) (protecting unpaid 
interns from discrimination). 
143.  N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296-c (LexisNexis 2016) (protecting unpaid interns from 
discrimination and sexual harassment). 
144.  OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.350 (2015) (protecting unpaid interns from discrimination 
and sexual harassment). 
145.  775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-101 (2014) (protecting unpaid interns from sexual 
harassment). 
146.  D.C. CODE §§ 2-1401.02, 2-1401.11 (2016) (protecting unpaid interns from 
discrimination and sexual harassment). 
147.  See, e.g., 2015 Conn. Acts 56 (2015).  “‘Intern’ means an individual who performs 
work for an employer for the purpose of training . . . .”  Id. 
148.  See, e.g., id. 
149.  See, e.g., id. 
150.  See id. 
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cover relationships beyond traditional employer-employee 
relationships.151 
III. MASSACHUSETTS SHOULD ALLOW ALL VOLUNTEERS WHO FACE 
DISCRIMINATION TO BRING CLAIMS UNDER THE PUBLIC 
ACCOMMODATION ANTI-DISCRIMINATION STATUTE 
Currently, if a volunteer is discriminated against based on 
membership or perceived membership in a protected class, the volunteer 
has limited remedies in Massachusetts courts.152  Volunteers are currently 
limited to claims brought under common law or under the Massachusetts 
civil rights statute.153  All volunteers should have greater statutory 
protections against discrimination because the current anti-discrimination 
statutes, as they apply to volunteers, do not provide sufficient 
protection.154  The Massachusetts civil rights statute only prevents 
constitutional rights from being interfered with by use of or attempted use 
of threats, intimidation, or coercion.155  Under the Massachusetts civil 
rights statute, if a volunteer is turned away or mistreated because of 
membership or perceived membership in a protected class, the volunteer 
would have no statutory claim because turning someone away does not 
involve threats, intimidation, or coercion per se.156 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has previously analyzed 
what constitutes an employer-employee relationship, implying that a 
volunteer cannot bring a claim under employment anti-discrimination law; 
the Legislature has not responded to this analysis.157  However, 
Massachusetts has not addressed whether a volunteer can bring a claim 
under public accommodation anti-discrimination laws.158  In determining 
whether a volunteer can bring a claim of discrimination under the 
Massachusetts public accommodation anti-discrimination statute, there 
are two questions that must be answered.159  First, is the recipient of the 
 
151.  See Comey v. Hill, 438 N.E.2d 811, 814 (Mass. 1982).   
152.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, §§ 11H–I (2016); Lowery v. Klemm, 845 N.E.2d 
1124, 1130–31 (Mass. 2006). 
153.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, §§ 11H–I (2016); Lowery v. Klemm, 845 N.E.2d 
1124, 1130–31 (Mass. 2006). 
154.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, §§ 11H–I (2016). 
155.  Id. 
156.  See id. 
157.  See Comey v. Hill, 438 N.E.2d 811, 814 (Mass. 1982) (regarding the scope of the 
Massachusetts employment anti-discrimination laws: “In the absence of any indication to the 
contrary, we will not assume that the Legislature intended to cover relationships outside the 
traditional common law employer-employee relationship.”). 
158.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98 (2016).  
159.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98 (2016).  
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volunteer efforts a place of public accommodation?160  Second, does the 
denial of the ability to volunteer amount to a denial of accommodations, 
advantages, facilities, or privileges?161  If the answer to both of these 
questions is yes, then Massachusetts should allow a volunteer to bring 
discrimination claims under the public accommodation anti-
discrimination statutes.162 
A. Places of Public Accommodation 
When a court determines the meaning of words in a statute, unless 
the word is a technical term, it “shall be construed according to the 
common and approved usage of the language . . . .”163  The Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court interpreted the meaning of “place” in the context 
of “place of public accommodation” in U.S. Jaycees v. Massachusetts 
Commission Against Discrimination.164 
The court in U.S. Jaycees considered whether an organization, U.S. 
Jaycees, would be considered a place of public accommodation for 
purposes of Massachusetts public accommodation anti-discrimination 
laws.165  The question arose when women were denied admission into the 
organization, and they alleged the denial of admission amounted to sex 
discrimination under the public accommodation anti-discrimination 
law.166  U.S. Jaycees limited membership to men aged eighteen to thirty-
five, which was supported by the organization’s by-laws.167 
The court analyzed various definitions of “place” and determined 
that on its face, the Massachusetts public accommodation anti-
discrimination law does not apply to membership organizations since they 
do not fall within the accepted definitions of “place.”168  The first criterion 
 
160.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 92A (2016).  “A place of public 
accommodation . . . shall be deemed to include any place, whether licensed or unlicensed, which 
is open to and accepts or solicits the patronage of the general public . . . .”  Id.  The 
Commonwealth provides a non-exhaustive list of examples of places of public accommodation.  
Id. 
161.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 98 (2016).  “All persons shall have the right to 
the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any place of public 
accommodation . . . .”  Id. 
162.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98 (2016). 
163.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 4, § 6 (2016). 
164.  See generally U.S. Jaycees v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination, 463 N.E.2d 
1151 (Mass. 1984). 
165.  Id. at 1152. 
166.  Id. 
167.  Id. at 1154.  The by-laws stated that the purpose of U.S. Jaycees is to “promote and 
foster the growth and development of young men’s civic organizations in the United 
States . . . .”  Id. at 1153. 
168.  Id. at 1156. 
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that must be met in determining whether something is a place of public 
accommodation is that it must be an actual physical place.169  The court 
noted that U.S. Jaycees does not maintain a “physical ‘place’ of operations 
in Massachusetts.”170  Because U.S. Jaycees did not have a primary place 
of operations in Massachusetts and an organization itself cannot be a place 
of public accommodation, the court concluded that U.S. Jaycees was not 
a place of public accommodation with regard to the public 
accommodation anti-discrimination laws.171  However, the court 
recognized that it was still possible for the organization to discriminate in 
a place of public accommodation.172  For instance, if an organization, 
while in a place of public accommodation, does not allow a person to 
participate because of his or her membership in a protected class, the 
organization’s actions may be considered discriminatory under the public 
accommodation anti-discrimination statute.173 
Applying the court’s analysis in U.S. Jaycees, whether a volunteer 
can allege discrimination in a place of public accommodation will depend 
on whether a business or organization has a primary place of operations 
in Massachusetts that receives the volunteer efforts.174  If a person 
volunteers—as either a service or donor volunteer—for a business or 
organization that has a primary physical place of operations in 
Massachusetts, then the recipient of the volunteer efforts would be 
considered a “place” and may fall within the scope of public 
accommodation anti-discrimination law.175  Importantly, however, even if 
the person or organization does not have a primary place of operations in 
Massachusetts, the recipient of the volunteer efforts may still be 
considered a “place” for purposes of the public accommodation anti-
discrimination law if the location of the alleged discriminatory act falls 
within the definition of “place” with regard to the statute.176 
 
169.  Id. at 1157. 
170.  Id. at 1156.  The court held that Massachusetts Jaycees, which maintains a place of 
operation in Massachusetts, could be considered a place of public accommodation.  Id. at 1160.  
Cf. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1209 (N.J. 1999) (stating that for twenty-five 
years, a “place” has not been restricted to a fixed location in New Jersey), rev’d for First 
Amendment concerns, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
171.  U.S. Jaycees, 463 N.E.2d at 1160. 
172.  Id. at 1157. 
173.  See id. at 1159–60.  Accordingly, “neither the U.S. Jaycees nor the Massachusetts 
Jaycees may discriminate against women in the admission to, or treatment on, the property of 
Massachusetts Jaycees.”  Id. at 1160. 
174.  See generally id. 
175.  See, e.g., id. at 1160 (holding an organization that does not have a primary place of 
operation in Massachusetts is not a place of public accommodation for purposes of the public 
accommodation antidiscrimination statute). 
176.  See id. at 1159–60. 
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After determining whether a business or organization is a place, it is 
necessary to determine whether that place would be considered a place of 
public accommodation.177  A “public accommodation” is defined as “[a] 
business that provides lodging, food, entertainment, or other services to 
the public . . . .”178  The Massachusetts public accommodation anti-
discrimination statute greatly increases the scope of the term “place of 
public accommodation” with “the inclusion of the words ‘any place . . . 
which is open to and accepts or solicits the patronage of the general 
public.’”179  Whereas the Massachusetts public accommodation anti-
discrimination statute enumerates examples of places of public 
accommodation, the broad legislative purpose for the statute indicates the 
list is not exhaustive and should not restrict application of the term “place 
of public accommodation.”180 
In the broadest application, a business or organization could be a 
place of public accommodation and could be liable to anyone under the 
public accommodation anti-discrimination statute so long as the business 
or organization solicits the patronage of someone in the general public.181  
However, in a narrower scope, claims under the public accommodation 
anti-discrimination statute could be limited to only those specific 
individuals from whom the place of public accommodation solicits 
patronage.182  “Patronage” is defined as “[t]he giving of support, 
sponsorship, or protection.”183  Financial support of a business from 
clients or customers would fit into this definition of patronage; 
additionally, support in the form of volunteer efforts could also fit into this 
definition.184 
Whereas the broadest application of the Massachusetts public 
accommodation anti-discrimination statute would apply to volunteers as 
well as anyone else, there is also a way in which the more narrow 
application would apply to volunteers.185  A common method of obtaining 
the help of volunteers is through recruitment.186  Recruitment of 
 
177.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 92A (2016). 
178.  Public Accommodation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (found as a 
sub-definition of accommodation).   
179.  Local Fin. Co. of Rockland v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimin., 242 N.E.2d 536, 
538 (Mass. 1968) (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 92A). 
180.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 92A (2016); Local Fin. Co. of Rockland, 242 N.E2d 
at 538. 
181.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 92A (2016); see also Ryan H. Nelson, An Indirect 
Challenge to the FDA’s “Gay Blood Ban”, 23 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 1, 12 (2014). 
182.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 92A (2016). 
183.  Patronage, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
184.  See id. 
185.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 92A (2016). 
186.  See Jenette Nagy, Recruiting Volunteers, COMMUNITY TOOL BOX, 
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volunteers is a type of solicitation, and consequently, solicitation of the 
volunteer’s support, or patronage.187  Therefore, if a business or 
organization attempts to recruit volunteers or publicly advertises the 
availability of volunteer opportunities, even the narrow view of what is 
encompassed by the term “place of public accommodation” would allow 
a volunteer to bring a claim under the Massachusetts public 
accommodation anti-discrimination statute should the business or 
organization violate the statute.188 
B. Denial of the Ability to Volunteer Based on Membership or 
Perceived Membership in a Protected Class Equates to a Violation 
of the Massachusetts Public Accommodation Anti-Discrimination 
Statute 
In determining whether a place of public accommodation has 
violated the Massachusetts public accommodation anti-discrimination 
statute by turning away a volunteer, it is necessary to examine whether the 
volunteer was denied the “accommodations, advantages, facilities, [or] 
privileges of [the] place of public accommodation” because of his 
membership in a protected class.189  Whereas volunteers typically do not 
receive remuneration, they often offer their services in order to receive 
something non-monetary in return.190  The benefits a volunteer receives 
depend on the individual volunteer and the type of volunteer work.191  
Although some benefits are consistent regardless of the type of 
volunteer,192 more often benefits vary depending on whether the volunteer 
is a service volunteer193 or a donor volunteer.194  The next step, therefore, 
is to examine the various benefits a volunteer receives and to determine 
whether these benefits could be considered accommodations, advantages, 
 
http://ctb.ku.edu/en/table-of-contents/structure/volunteers/recruiting/main [https://
perma.cc/8AJE-CPYL].   
187.  See Solicitation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The act or an 
instance of requesting or seeking to obtain something; a request or petition . . . .”). 
188.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 92A (2016). 
189.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 98 (2016). 
190.  Nagy, supra note 186. 
191.  See WALTER P. PIDGEON, JR., THE UNIVERSAL BENEFITS OF VOLUNTEERING 37–
38 (1998).   
192.  See, e.g., CHARLES A. BENNETT, VOLUNTEERING: THE SELFISH BENEFITS 29 
(2001).  “Selfless people are good people . . . .  They’re in it for the image, a quick ‘feel good.’”  
Id. at 29. 
193.  See, e.g., Horoszowski, 5 Surprising Benefits, supra note 13. 
194.  See, e.g., Feigenbaum, supra note 13; Rachel Swalin, 4 Unexpected Benefits of 
Donating Blood, HEALTH (June 13, 2014), http://news health.com/2014/06/13/4-unexpected-
benefits-of-donating-blood/ [https://perma.cc/WSM9-R8FS]. 
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facilities, or privileges.195 
For purposes of this Note, a service volunteer is someone who offers 
his services without expectation of remuneration.196  Service volunteers 
can take various forms; the most common examples of service volunteers, 
however, are what many consider to be traditional volunteers—people 
who give their time to activities, such as reading to children in an 
orphanage—and interns—people who give their services with the goal of 
increasing professional experience.197  A donor volunteer is someone who 
makes donations.198  Donor volunteers give tangible goods such as blood 
or money.199  Volunteers gain various types of benefits—physical, mental, 
social, professional, and economic—as a result of their volunteer 
efforts.200  Benefits may apply to volunteers as a general class or to one 
specific type of volunteer.201  For example, studies have shown that those 
who volunteer receive more health benefits than the recipients of the 
volunteer efforts.202 
1. Benefits for Service Volunteers 
Research shows a significant relationship between improved 
physical health and volunteering.203  Those who volunteer tend to have 
lower mortality rates than those who do not volunteer.204  Additionally, 
studies have shown that service volunteers have increased functional 
ability.205  Some volunteers may even report experiencing a “helper’s 
high . . . an actual physical sensation that occurs when people help others 
 
195.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98 (2016). 
196.  See Service, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“Labor performed in the 
interest . . . of others.”); Volunteer, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“Someone 
who gratuitously and freely confers a benefit on another[.]”). 
197.  See 5 Different Types of Volunteering Activities, VOLUNTEER WKLY. (Nov. 30, 
2012), http://www.volunteerweekly.org/types-of-volunteering-activities/ 
[https://perma.cc/Z6R5-QH9F ] [hereinafter 5 Different Types]. 
198.  See Donor, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“Someone who gives 
something without receiving consideration for the transfer.”); Volunteer, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
199.  See, e.g., Ways to Donate, AM. RED CROSS, http://www.redcross.org/
donations/ways-to-donate [https://perma.cc/XL6P-ZFFV]; Ways to Give, FEEDING AM., 
http://www.feedingamerica.org/ways-to-give/ [https://perma.cc/2QYJ-FVQA]. 
200.  See ROBERT GRIMM JR. ET AL., OFFICE OF RESEARCH & POLICY DEV., CORP. FOR 
NAT’L & CMTY. SERV., THE HEALTH BENEFITS OF VOLUNTEERING: A REVIEW OF RECENT 
RESEARCH 1 (2007); 5 Different Types, supra note 197; Feigenbaum, supra note 13. 
201.  See generally, e.g., GRIMM JR. ET AL., supra note 200; Horoszowski, 5 Surprising 
Benefits, supra note 13; Feigenbaum, supra note 13. 
202.  GRIMM JR. ET AL., supra note 200, at 3. 
203.  Id. at 1. 
204.  Id. 
205.  Id. 
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that makes them experience greater energy and strength . . . .”206 
Additionally, volunteers experience increased mental health and 
social benefits.207  Volunteers who freely give their time feel they have 
more free time.208  “[T]he feeling of having more time” tends to lead to 
lower stress levels.209  Volunteering has also been shown to lead to 
reduced depression later in the volunteer’s life.210  Volunteers feel socially 
connected, experience increased levels of self-esteem and happiness, and 
enjoy improved psychological well-being.211  Volunteers also feel more 
loved.212  “Volunteering builds empathy, strengthens social bonds and 
makes you smile—all factors that increase the feeling of love.”213  
Additionally, service volunteers build more bonds with fellow volunteers 
and with organizers, thereby leading to an increased sense of belonging.214 
Furthermore, people who volunteer develop new skills.215  When 
service volunteers partake in skill-based volunteer work such as 
internships, they gain additional professional benefits.216  Volunteering 
can also lead to career gains.217  Internships provide opportunities to 
network and to connect with mentors in a specific field of business.218  
Additionally, internships allow the volunteer to gain new skills and “real 
world” experience.219  An internship provides an opportunity for the 
volunteer to explore career options and ensure the career path is correct 
 
206.  Rita Altman, The Benefits of Volunteering, HUFF. POST (Aug. 5, 2013, 6:06 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rita-altman-rn/the-benefits-of-volunteer_b_3377383 html 
[https://perma.cc/CB3E-2G6X]. 
207.  GRIMM JR. ET AL., supra note 200, at 1. 
208.  See Horoszowski, 5 Surprising Benefits, supra note 13. 
209.  Mark Horoszowski, Volunteering Makes You Happier—Here’s Why, MOVING 
WORLDS (Feb. 12, 2014), http://blog movingworlds.org/volunteering-makes-you-happier/ 
[https://perma.cc/P526-S7J5] [hereinafter Horoszowski, Volunteering Makes You Happier]. 
210.  GRIMM JR. ET AL., supra note 200, at 1. 
211.  Phillip Moeller, Why Helping Others Makes Us Happy, U.S. NEWS (Apr. 4, 2012, 
9:20 AM), http://money.usnews.com/money/personal-finance/articles/2012/04/04/why-
helping-others-makes-us-happy. 
212.  Horoszowski, 5 Surprising Benefits, supra note 13. 
213.  Id. 
214.  Horoszowski, Volunteering Makes You Happier, supra note 209. 
215.  Horoszowski, 5 Surprising Benefits, supra note 13. 
216.  See Heather Huhman, Why You Should Get a Summer Internship, U.S. NEWS (Apr. 
29, 2011, 9:00 AM), http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/outside-voices-
careers/2011/04/29/why-you-should-get-a-summer-internship [https://perma.cc/Q825-EXM3]. 
217.  Dawn C. Carr, 5 Reasons Why You Should Volunteer, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Mar. 12, 
2014), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-third-age/201403/5-reasons-why-you-
should-volunteer [https://perma.cc/TDG8-FWPP]. 
218.  Beth Braccio Hering, Why Are Internships So Important?, CNN (Apr. 14, 2010, 
11:09 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/LIVING/worklife/04/14/cb.why.internships.important/ 
[https://perma.cc/GNQ2-AW4R]. 
219.  Id. 
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for the volunteer.220  If it is, an internship could put the volunteer in a 
position where he has an advantage for future employment 
opportunities.221  If the internship does not lead to employment, the service 
volunteer has nevertheless strengthened his resume and made connections 
for future employment references elsewhere.222 
2. Benefits for Donor Volunteers 
There are certain types of benefits specific to donor volunteers.223  
Federal law allows a deduction on federal taxes for charitable 
contributions.224  This tax benefit could serve as a motivation for many 
who make donations.225  However, donor volunteers seeking a tax 
deduction are not limited to contributing monetary donations.226  A donor 
volunteer can receive tax deductions by donating used clothing to thrift 
shops and reporting the value of the donated goods to the Internal Revenue 
Service.227  A donor volunteer is also entitled to a tax deduction for the 
fair market value of donated food and household goods.228  Additionally, 
when a donor volunteer donates an automobile to an IRS-qualified 
organization, the donor volunteer can claim a tax deduction up to the fair 
market value of the car.229 
There are also additional benefits when a donor volunteer gives 
biological material, such as blood.230  Blood donors experience health 
benefits including increased blood flow.231  While there is no confirmed 
correlation between the increased blood flow and long lasting health 
benefits, studies have shown that people who donate blood are 
hospitalized less often.232  Additionally, blood donors receive the 
equivalent of a “mini check-up” when they donate blood, as blood donors 
 
220.  Huhman, supra note 216. 
221.  Id. 
222.  Id. 
223.  See, e.g., Feigenbaum, supra note 13. 
224.  26 U.S.C. § 170(a)(1) (2014). 
225.  See Feigenbaum, supra note 13. 
226.  See, e.g., Ron Lieber, Tax-Deductible Clothing Donations Are Great, Except Your 
Used Socks, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2015), http:// www nytimes.com/2015/05/16/your-
money/tax-deductible-clothing-donations-are-great-except-your-used-socks html?_r=1 
[https://perma.cc/PAM4-2DCB]; Can I Get Tax Deductions for Charitable Contributions, 
EFILE.COM, http://www.efile.com/tax-deduction/income-deduction/charitable-contributions/ 
[https://perma.cc/KC3C-KS9U] [hereinafter Can I Get Tax Deductions]. 
227.  Lieber, supra note 226. 
228.  Can I Get Tax Deductions, supra note 226. 
229.  TAX EXEMPT AND GOV’T ENTITIES DIV., IRS, A DONOR’S GUIDE TO CAR 
DONATION 3, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/pub4303.pdf [https://perma.cc/PY4M-NDMP]. 
230.  See, e.g., Swalin, supra note 194. 
231.  Id. 
232.  Id. 
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are required to have their temperature, blood pressure, pulse, and 
hemoglobin levels checked prior to donating.233  Donated blood is also 
screened for sexually transmitted infections and other infectious 
diseases.234  Additionally, blood donation helps to regulate iron levels in 
the body.235  Donating blood removes iron from the body and statistics 
show that decreasing the amount of iron in a healthy person’s body is 
beneficial to the person’s health.236  By donating blood, the blood donor 
also reduces his general risk of certain types of heart disease.237 
3. The Denial of Benefits Volunteers Receive Amounts to a 
Denial of Privileges and Advantages 
Regardless of the types of volunteer efforts, volunteering provides 
various benefits to the volunteer.238  Many organizations promote these 
benefits in an effort to recruit volunteers.239  The pivotal question is 
 
233.  Id. 
234.  Id.  Similarly, sperm donors receive benefits such as STD testing, physical exams, 
and genetic testing.  See Benefits of Becoming a Donor, SPERM BANK OF CAL., 
https://www.thespermbankofca.org/content/benefits-and-compensation [https://
perma.cc/Q3L5-32AX]. 
235.  Swalin, supra note 194. 
236.  Id. 
237. Health Benefits of Donating Blood, ONE BLOOD, https://www.oneblood.org/about-
donating/blood-donor-basics/can-i-donate/health-benefits.stml [https://perma.cc/9TSN-
XCCL].  Similar to blood donation, a person can also donate plasma, which typically entails 
receipt of some form of monetary compensation.  See, e.g., Plasma Donation FAQs, 
OCTAPHARMA PLASMA, http://octapharmaplasma.com/donor/plasma-donation-faq 
[https://perma.cc/72YV-YFFR].  It is arguable whether the donation of plasma is a volunteer 
effort because of the receipt of monetary compensation.  See id.  See also Remuneration, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  Some plasma donation centers emphasize that the 
compensation is in exchange for the time spent donating plasma, not the plasma itself.  See, e.g., 
Plasma Donation FAQs, supra note 237.  Thus, this compensation could be viewed as 
remuneration.  See Remuneration, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  Therefore, 
instead of being considered a volunteer, the donor may be viewed as an independent contractor 
entrusted with the task of giving plasma.  See Independent Contractor, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  Whereas the plasma donor would not fit neatly into the definition 
of independent contractor, the receipt of remuneration in exchange for the time spent donating 
plasma raises the question of whether the donor could be considered an independent contractor.  
See id.  However, if the compensation is in exchange for the time spent donating, it would not 
counter an argument that the plasma donor is a donor volunteer.  See, e.g., Plasma Donation 
FAQs, supra note 237.  Regardless, the plasma donor will receive benefits that apply to 
volunteers in general, such as improved psychological and mental well-being.  See 
Horoszowski, Volunteering Makes You Happier, supra note 209. 
238.  See GRIMM JR. ET AL., supra note 200, at 1; 5 Different Types supra note 197; 
Feigenbaum, supra note 13. 
239. See, e.g., Benefits of Volunteering, ASUG, https://www.asug.com/
volunteers/benefits-of-volunteering [https://perma.cc/PR5R-PVXT]; Benefits of Volunteering, 
BIG BROTHERS BIG SISTERS MASS. BAY, http://www.bbbsmb.org/
site/c.9gKMJZMxF7LUG/b.8724893/k.5791/Benefits_of_Volunteering htm [https://
perma.cc/57HL-ZLFC]; Why Donate Blood?, AM. RED CROSS, 
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whether denial of these benefits based on the volunteer’s membership in 
a protected class would amount to a denial of “accommodations, 
advantages, facilities [or] privileges” for purposes of the Massachusetts 
public accommodation anti-discrimination statute.240  To answer this 
question, it is necessary to understand the definitions of each of these 
words.  An “accommodation” is “[a] convenience supplied by someone; 
esp[ecially], lodging and food.”241  An “advantage” is “[a]ny benefit or 
gain.”242  A “facility” is “something that makes an action, operation, or 
course of conduct easier.”243  A “privilege” is “a right . . . granted as a 
peculiar benefit, advantage, or favor.”244  These definitions are important 
because Massachusetts law labels “the right to the full and equal 
accommodations, advantage, facilities and privileges of any place of 
public accommodation” as a civil right.245 
Ryan H. Nelson addressed this question in his article An Indirect 
Challenge to the FDA’s “Gay Blood Ban,”246 albeit within the narrow 
scope of a man who has had sex with another man being banned from 
donating blood.247  Focusing on the benefits a blood donor receives, such 
as a “mini physical,” Nelson stated that because denying a person the 
 
http://www.redcrossblood.org/donating-blood/why-donate-blood [https://perma.cc/ZMR5-
22TD]; 4 Personal Benefits of Volunteering in Your Community, UNITED WAY (Oct. 2, 2012), 
http://www.unitedway.org/blog/4-personal-benefits-of-volunteering-in-your-community 
[https://perma.cc/XN3Z-A3KJ].  
240.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 98 (2016).  The statute itself does not define these 
terms.  See id. 
241.  Accommodation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
242.  Advantage, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
243.  Facility, MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2004). 
244.  Privilege, MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2004). 
245.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 98 (2016). 
246.  Nelson, supra note 181.  
247.  Id. at 4.  The U.S. Food and Drug Administration recently changed its policy 
regarding the indefinite ban on men who have had sex with men being able to donate blood.  
FDA Updates Blood Donor Deferral Policy to Reflect the Most Current Scientific Evidence and 
Continue to Ensure the Safety of the U.S. Blood Supply, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Dec. 21, 
2015), http://www fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm478031 htm 
[https://perma.cc/SK2X-88L3].  The updated policy only bans men who have sex with men 
from donating blood for a twelve-month period after they have had sex with another man.  Id.  
The June 2016 mass shooting at Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida, revitalized the debate over 
the FDA’s ban disallowing men who have had sex with men from donating blood.  See Donald 
G. McNeil, Jr., Orlando Shooting Renews Debate Over Limits on Gay Men Donating Blood, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2016), http://www nytimes.com/2016/06/16/health/orlando-shooting-
renews-debate-over-limits-on-gay-men-donating-blood html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/KDJ7-
6X7P].  Prompted in part by the fact that Pulse was a gay nightclub, gay men under the 
impression that restrictions had been relaxed prepared to donate blood and help victims, yet 
were turned away because the FDA’s restrictions remained intact.  Id.  See Lizette Alvarez & 
Richard Pérez Peña, Orlando Gunman Attacks Gay Nightclub, Leaving 50 Dead, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 12, 2016), http://www nytimes.com/2016/06/13/us/orlando-nightclub-shooting html.  
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ability to donate blood denies the person the perks associated with the 
blood donation, it equates to a denial of advantages and privileges.248  It is 
less likely the denial of these benefits would amount to a denial of 
accommodations or facilities.249 
Nelson’s argument could be expanded to all volunteers.250  
Volunteers receive a multitude of benefits for their efforts.251  If a person 
is denied the ability to volunteer, the person will be denied the benefits he 
otherwise would have received.252  Additionally, based on the definition 
of “advantage” as “[a]ny benefit or gain . . . ,” it reasonably follows that 
the denial of these benefits would also amount to a denial of advantages.253  
Similarly, with “privilege” being defined as “a right or benefit that is given 
to some people and not to others,” it is a reasonable inference that the 
denial of benefits would equate to a denial of privileges.254  Therefore, if 
a business or organization with a principal place of operations in 
Massachusetts solicits volunteers and denies someone the opportunity to 
volunteer based on his membership in a protected class, then the business 
or organization would likely be violating the Massachusetts public 
accommodation anti-discrimination statute.255  Massachusetts should thus 
allow a volunteer to bring a discrimination claim under the public 
accommodation anti-discrimination law.256 
C. Public Policy Supports Granting Volunteers the Ability to Bring 
Discrimination Claims under the Massachusetts Public 
Accommodation Anti-Discrimination Statute 
Maintaining a strong volunteer workforce is integral to the success 
of many businesses, especially mission-driven workforces.257  
Organizations that aim to improve society, “places like museums, social 
service organizations, and faith-based organizations[,]” typically depend 
on unpaid volunteers to help accomplish their goals.258  Volunteers help 
keep our cities and towns clean, mentor and teach society’s youth, and 
educate the public; this is just a small sampling of what volunteers do to 
 
248.  Nelson, supra note 181, at 4–5.  
249.  Id. at 5. 
250.  See id. 
251.  See supra Sections III.B.1, III.B.2. 
252.  See supra Sections III.B.1, III.B.2. 
253.  See Advantage, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
254.  See Privilege, MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2004). 
255.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98 (2016). 
256.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98 (2016). 
257.  Carr, supra note 217. 
258.  Id. 
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help society.259  Volunteers are critical to helping society function.260 
Examining what would happen if there were no volunteers brings 
into relief the importance of volunteers in society.261  “[I]magine if one 
day, all volunteers simply didn’t show up . . . .  What basic needs would 
go unmet?  What opportunities to grow, learn, and thrive as a society 
would be lost?”262  Massachusetts has experienced volunteer shortages 
first-hand.263  One example of an organization that suffers from a lack of 
volunteers is the Massachusetts Chapter of the American Red Cross, 
which solicited for donations of blood and platelets to counteract a 
seasonal shortage in 2015.264  Another example is the Girl Scouts, which 
has numerous girls annually who are placed on a waitlist due to lack of 
adult volunteers.265 
A shortage of volunteers has detrimental impacts on society.266  Why 
then should it be acceptable to discriminate against a volunteer and reject 
his offerings of volunteer efforts solely because of his membership or 
perceived membership in a protected class?  Prohibiting discrimination of 
volunteers will benefit society by helping to prevent a further decrease in 
volunteers that would result from the discrimination.267  For public policy 
reasons, it is in the best interest of the Commonwealth to allow volunteers 
to bring discrimination claims under the Massachusetts public 
accommodation anti-discrimination statute.268 
 
259.  Why is Volunteering Important?, IDEALIST, http://www.idealist.org/info/
Volunteer/Why [https://perma.cc/NZ7D-KCFT].  Idealist is part of the non-profit organization 
Action Without Borders, and is intended to connect people with non-profit organizations in 
order to do more with what we have.  See A Brief History of Idealist, IDEALIST, 
http://www.idealist.org/info/About/History [https://perma.cc/C7XX-74BK].  See also 
Volunteer Resource Center, IDEALIST, http://www.idealist.org/info/Volunteer 
[https://perma.cc/Y7A2-7K7G].  Volunteering helps to bring about local action and help 
society, while allowing people to find volunteer opportunities.  See A Brief History of Idealist, 
supra note 259.  See also Volunteer Resource Center, supra note 259. 
260.  Why is Volunteering Important?, supra note 259. 
261.  See id. 
262.  Id. 
263.  See Volunteering in MA, supra note 2. 
264.  Red Cross Urges Summer Blood and Platelet Donations to Prevent Seasonal 
Shortage, AM. RED CROSS (May 18, 2015), http://www redcrossblood.org/news/ma/red-cross-
urges-summer-blood-and-platelet-donations-prevent-seasonal-shortage 
[https://perma.cc/9LJK-GXKX] [hereinafter Red Cross Urges Donations]. 
265.  Brian Lee, Girl Scout Numbers on Decline in Worcester Area over Volunteer 
Shortage, TELEGRAM.COM (Oct. 19, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://
www.telegram.com/article/20141019/NEWS/310199795 [https://perma.cc/Y3MZ-MNVR] 
[hereinafter Girl Scout Numbers]. 
266.  See Why is Volunteering Important?, supra note 259. 
267.  See, e.g., Red Cross Urges Donations, supra note 264; Girl Scout Numbers, supra 
note 265. 
268.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98 (2016).  It is possible that an argument 
could be made asserting that it is against public policy to allow volunteers to bring a legal claim 
alleging discrimination against an employer.  This could potentially lead organizations to stop 
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CONCLUSION 
Volunteering provides multiple benefits to both the volunteer and the 
recipient of the volunteer efforts.269  These benefits take many forms 
(physical, mental, social, professional, and economic) and are found with 
service volunteers and donor volunteers.270  Regardless of the benefits 
incurred, there is often a shortage of volunteers, and consequently, a 
continual need for more volunteers.271  This shortage of volunteers has 
been experienced first-hand in Massachusetts, where only about 25 
percent of residents volunteer.272  When a business or organization refuses 
a volunteer because of his membership in a protected class, the shortage 
of volunteers is exacerbated.273 
Currently, a volunteer in Massachusetts has limited statutory 
protections against discrimination.274  Volunteers can bring a claim under 
the Massachusetts civil rights statute only if the discrimination is the result 
of “threats, intimidation or coercion, or attempt[ed] . . . threats, 
intimidation, or coercion.”275  If a person is not permitted to volunteer 
because of his membership in a protected class, he is denied the various 
benefits afforded to volunteers, which would amount to a denial of 
privileges and advantages.276  Assuming the business or organization is 
soliciting volunteer efforts and has a principal place of operations in 
Massachusetts, it would likely be considered a place of public 
accommodation.277  Based on these criteria being met, the business or 
organization would be discriminating in a place of public 
accommodation.278  Therefore, Massachusetts should allow anyone who 
is denied the ability to volunteer in a place of public accommodation based 
on membership or perceived membership in a protected class the 
opportunity to bring a discrimination claim under the Massachusetts 
 
providing volunteer opportunities in an effort to avoid discrimination allegations.  While it 
would seem the public policy behind stopping discrimination would be more powerful, this 
argument will not be analyzed in this Note. 
269.  See GRIMM JR. ET AL., supra note 200, at 3. 
270.  See, e.g., Horoszowski, 5 Surprising Benefits, supra note 13; Feigenbaum, supra 
note 13. 
271.  See Paul Clolery, Troubling Numbers in Volunteering Rates, NON PROFIT TIMES 
(Feb. 27, 2014), http://www.thenonprofittimes.com/news-articles/troubling-numbers-in-
volunteering-rates/ [https://perma.cc/CB44-HDLU]. 
272.  Volunteering in MA, supra note 2. 
273.  See Clolery, supra note 271. 
274.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, §§ 11H–I (2016). 
275.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, § 11H (2016). 
276.  See, e.g., Horoszowski, 5 Surprising Benefits, supra note 13; Feigenbaum, supra 
note 13. 
277.  Cf. U.S. Jaycees v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination, 463 N.E.2d 1151, 1160 
(Mass. 1984).  See Local Fin. Co. of Rockland v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination, 242 
N.E.2d 536, 538 (Mass. 1968). 
278.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98 (2016). 
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public accommodation anti-discrimination statute.279 
When John and Jim were denied the opportunity to volunteer at the 
food pantry, they were turned away because the manager of the food 
pantry believed they were in a same-sex relationship.  Similarly, the 
manager refused John and Jim’s donations for the same reason.  The denial 
of the opportunity to volunteer and the rejection of the donation constitute 
a denial of the benefits that are intrinsic to volunteering.  Whereas John 
and Jim currently would have no statutory protections available to them, 
this proposed change in the scope of the Massachusetts public 
accommodation anti-discrimination statute would afford John and Jim 
statutory protections while also benefitting the public. 
 
279.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98 (2016). 
